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Do cross-border mergers and acquisitions increase short-term market 
performance? The case of Chinese firms 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite the new momentum in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by emerging market 
firms, we have a limited understanding of the impact of these activities. Drawing on signalling 
theory and the institution-based view, this paper examines the extent of stock market reactions to 
the announcement of cross-border M&A deals, based on an event study of a sample of Chinese 
firms during the period 2000-2012. The findings indicate that the announcement of cross-border 
M&As results in a positive stock market reaction; this effect is more significant in the mainland 
Chinese stock markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) than that in the Hong Kong market. The 
shareholders of Chinese firms that acquire a target firm in a host country with a low level of 
political risk gain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those firms targeting companies in 
countries with a high level of political risk. The shareholders of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
experience lower abnormal returns compared with those of Chinese privately owned firms when 
engaging in cross-border M&A deals.  
 
Keywords: Chinese firms, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, stock market reactions, political 
risk, ownership   
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1. Introduction 
Emerging-economy (EE) firms have increasingly used cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) as their internationalization strategy in recent years. For example, Chinese 
firms have been actively involved in cross-border M&As due to the ‘Go Out Policy’ (Chen, 2008) 
implemented by the Chinese government. The number of completed cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms was only 33 in 2000 and the total value of these deals was $838.86 million dollars, 
whereas in 2012 the number of completed deals increased to 146 and their value reached $22.32 
billion dollars (Thomson One Banker, 2013). Chinese firms have attracted attention worldwide 
with a series of high-profile cross-border M&As involving well-known western companies, 
including Lenovo’s acquisition of the Motorola Mobility division (2014) and IBM’s PC division 
(2005), Geely's acquisition of Volvo Corporation (2010), Wanda’s acquisition of Sunseeker (2013) 
and the AMC Cinema chain (2012), and Huawei’s acquisition of Symantec (2011) and CIP (2012). 
No wonder that the Economist (2010) noted that ‘China buys up the world’.  
Despite the rapid pace and increasing importance of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms, 
existing research has predominantly focused on M&As undertaken by firms from developed 
countries (Ghosh, 2001; Kruse, et al., 2007; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Pazarskis, et al., 
2006; Sharma & Ho, 2002). Only recently have a growing number of studies begun to examine 
cross-border M&As by EE firms (Buckley, Elia, & Kafouros, 2014; Deng & Yang, 2015; Lebedev, 
et al., 2015; Ning, et al., 2014; Sun, et al., 2012). Some of these studies (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 
2011; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Wang & Boateng, 2007; Zhou, et al., 2015) found a positive 
market reaction to cross-border M&As, while others (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Chen & Young, 2010) 
found a negative one. The inconsistent findings of the existing studies suggest that stock market 
reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms need further academic scrutiny.  
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In addition, existing research has tended to assume that there are the same market reactions 
across stock markets in mainland China and Hong Kong. However, under the formula of ‘one 
country, two systems’ (China.org.cn, 2008), the Hong Kong stock market is different from those of 
mainland China. This leads to a ‘one country, two markets’ scenario, thus demonstrating the unique 
institutional setting of China’s stock markets. The different institutional arrangements (e.g. 
ownership restrictions, currency control and liquidity restrictions) between the two markets within 
one country may trigger different market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms. This unique ‘one country, two markets’ scenario remains underexplored in the 
domain of cross-border M&As.  
Furthermore, there is a lack of comprehensive studies to investigate whether the level of 
political risk in target countries, and the ownership status of acquiring firms, spur different market 
reactions to cross-border M&A deals. The stock market is sensitive to any political risk associated 
with cross-border M&As, which is considered as an important signal, especially in emerging 
economies (Chan & Wei, 1996; Kim & Mei, 2001; Wang, Liu, & Wang, 2004). However, existing 
studies tend to focus on the impact of geographic and cultural distance on cross-border M&As 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Ragozzino, 2009) without explicitly taking political risk into 
account. A recent study by Harzing & Pudelko (2016) has shown that cultural distance is often used 
as a proxy for political risk and government restrictions in a host country, and calls for more studies 
that use more appropriate and accurate constructs to measure host country characteristics, such as 
political risk. In addition to political risk, we have a limited understanding of how the ownership 
status of Chinese acquiring firms affects investors’ perception, and hence stock market reactions.  
To remedy these research gaps, we examine the following research questions. What are the 
stock market reactions to cross-border M&A announcements by Chinese firms? Do investors in the 
Hong Kong stock market respond differently to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms compared 
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with those in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in mainland China? To what extent does 
political risk in the country of origin of the target firms, and the ownership status of the acquiring 
firms, affect the short-term stock market performance of Chinese firms with cross-border M&As?  
To address these research questions, we build our study on signalling theory and the 
institution-based view to propose that the short-term market performance of Chinese acquiring 
firms is influenced by a variety of factors including the different institutional settings within China, 
the political risk of target countries and the ownership status of the acquiring firms. Signalling 
theory is used to underpin stock market reactions to cross-border M&As while the institution-based 
view is adopted to reveal what is behind investors’ perceptions in stock markets. In contrast to 
existing studies which investigate the direct relationship between cross-border M&As and firm 
performance, this paper intends to capture stock market reactions based on signalling theory, and 
unpack how stock markets react to cross-border M&As by Chinese listed firms. More specifically, 
we aim to reveal the extent of market reactions to the institutional characteristics associated with 
cross-border M&A deals by Chinese listed firms using an event-study method.  
Examining the impact of Chinese firms’ cross-border M&As in a systematic manner is 
timely and enables us to make a number of contributions to the literature on cross-border M&As in 
general and EE firms in particular. First, by integrating signalling theory with the institution-based 
view, this study helps to deepen our understanding of key institutional factors affecting stock 
market reactions to cross-border M&A activities by EE firms. Second, the findings from this 
research will provide new insights into different market reactions to the same cross-border M&A 
events within one country with two markets. Our study is one of the first to investigate the extent to 
which the impact of cross-border M&As is contingent on the degree of capital market 
development. Finally, by examining the impact of political risk in host countries and the ownership 
status of acquiring firms on the short-term market performance of cross-border M&As, our study 
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captures the extent to which different institutional dimensions, such as political risk and ownership 
status, influence the market reactions of such activities. The findings enrich our understanding of 
the performance implications of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms by delineating under what 
conditions cross-border M&As create value for Chinese acquirers.  
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, a number of hypotheses are developed 
based on the signalling theory and institution-based views. We describe the sample and 
methodology used in the study in Section 3. The results are discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 
discusses findings and their implications, followed by the conclusions.  
2. Theory and hypotheses 
A cross-border M&A could be interpreted as an indication of a substantial change in a 
firm’s corporate strategy. Stock market investors will react to this change through buying or selling 
stocks according to their perception of the firm’s future performance, which constitutes the stock 
market reaction. The terms ‘stock market reaction’ and ‘investors’ reactions’ are interchangeable. 
Existing research on stock market reactions to cross-border M&As is summarized in Table 1 and 
can be classified into two broad categories according the country of origin of the acquiring firms – 
developed countries or emerging economies. 
Considerable research has been devoted to the impact of cross-border M&As on the 
short-term shareholder values of acquiring firms from developed countries (Asquith, 1983; Faccio, 
McConnell, & Stolin, 2006; Firth, 1980; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; 
Schwert, 2000). However, the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, the extant studies 
conducted by Asquith (1983), Morck et al. (1990), Lang et al. (1991), Schwert (2000), Floreani and 
Rigamonti (2001), Moeller et al. (2005), Faccio et al. (2006) and Masulis et al. (2007) found 
positive abnormal returns for the shareholders of U.S. acquiring firms. In contrast, Langetieg 
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(1978) provided a contrary view, indicating that U.S. acquiring firms earn significant negative 
abnormal returns over the six months before and the twelve months after the merger date, which are 
similar to those reported in more recent studies (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Sudarsanam, Holl, & 
Salami, 1996; Walker, 2000). Bruner (2002) suggested that in the aggregate, abnormal returns to 
shareholders of U.S. acquiring firms are essentially zero.  
Positive abnormal returns have been reported for other developed markets, such as Japan 
(Kang, Shivdasani, & Yamada, 2000; Pettway & Yamada, 1986), Canada (Eckbo & Thorburn, 
2009) and several European countries (Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2006; Goergen & 
Renneboog, 2004; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). For example, Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) 
using a sample of Canadian mergers and acquisitions provided evidence that shareholders of 
acquiring firms earned positive returns between the periods 1998-2000. On the contrary, 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) examined a sample of 519 UK acquirers over the period 1983 to 
1995 and found negative abnormal returns relative to the month of the merger announcement, with 
only a third of acquirers experiencing wealth gains. Campa and Hernando (2004) also showed 
negative cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring firms involving cross-border M&As.  
Despite the increasing number of cross-border M&As by EE firms, limited studies have 
examined the impact of cross-border M&As by these firms. Zhu and Malhotra (2008) find 
evidence of positive gains for  the short-term shareholders of Indian acquiring firms. Likewise,  
using a sample of 425 cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms, Gubbi et al. (2010) show that the 
shareholders of acquiring firms earned positive abnormal returns from 2000 to 2007. A similar 
study of 8 emerging countries by Bhagat et al. (2011) based on a sample 678 firms over the 
1991-2008 period reports that cross-border M&As earn positive returns for acquiring firms. 
However, Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border acquisitions associated with 58 
emerging-market multinationals between the years 1991-2004 and show that shareholders of 
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acquiring firms earn negative abnormal returns.   
Insert Table 1 near here 
 
Our review of the literature shows that existing studies have either focused on a direct link 
between M&A deals and stock market reactions without providing a theoretical underpinning for 
such reactions (Ben-Amar & Andre, 2006; Faccio, McConnell, & Stolin, 2006; Floreani & 
Rigamonti, 2001; Gubbi, et al., 2010), or adopted the resource-based view (Gubbi, et al., 2010; 
Ning, et al., 2014) and agency theory (Chen & Young, 2010) to examine the impact of internal 
factors on stock market performance. Although a few studies have considered the impact of 
geographic distance (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Ragozzino, 2009) and cultural distance 
(Nicholson & Salaber, 2013) on cross-border M&As, which were used to proxy political risk in 
host countries (Harzing & Pudelko, 2016). This constrains our understanding of how stock markets 
react to the political risk associated with cross-border M&As. Departing from existing research, we 
combine signalling theory and the institution-based view to capture market reactions to 
cross-border M&As by Chinese firms by taking account of the impact of various institutional 
factors.  
Signalling theory is based on the assumption that information is not equally available to all 
parties at the same time and the theory is fundamentally concerned with reducing information 
asymmetry between different parties (Spence, 2002). This theory helps to explain how 
decision-makers interpret and respond to situations where information is both incomplete and 
asymmetrically distributed among parties (Spence, 1973; 1974). It includes three primary 
elements: signallers, receivers and the signal itself. Signallers are insiders (e.g. managers or 
executives) who obtain information about individuals (Spence, 1973) and products (Kirmani & 
Rao, 2000) and organizations (Ross, 1977). This information is not available to outsiders. 
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Receivers are outsiders who lack information about the organization but would like to receive this 
information. Due to information asymmetries, outsiders (e.g. investors) cannot obtain adequate 
information to accurately assess a firm’s true value.  
Signalling theory is built on the premise that an internal party, such as an acquirer, 
possesses special information while external parties, such as investors, may not be able to access 
such information and may need to rely on other information (Arrow, 1968; 1973; 1959; Arrow & 
Debreu, 1954; Grossman & Hart, 1981; Nelson, 1970). This theory has been used in a variety of 
management literatures, including strategic management (Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013; Priem, 
Li, & Carr, 2012; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012), entrepreneurship (Ahlers, et al., 2015; Bergh, et al., 
2014; Moss, Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015), and human resource management (Lourenço, et al., 
2014; Renwick, Redman, & Maguire, 2012). 
We adopt signalling theory to predict how investors would react to the announcement of 
cross-border M&As through buying and selling shares in the stock market. The announcement of 
cross-border M&As serves as a signal sent by acquiring firms and can influence the expectations of 
investors. If there is strong confidence in the management of the acquiring firm, and the 
information about the M&A transaction is explicit, it should be reflected in the stock market 
reaction. If the announcement of a cross-border M&A is interpreted by investors as an optimistic 
belief in the future, this should cause an increase in the stock price. It is also true where the 
announcement of cross-border M&As is perceived negatively by investors, resulting in an decrease 
in stock prices.  
While signalling theory can help capture stock market reactions to cross-border M&A 
deals, it is insufficient to reveal what is behind such reactions toward such M&A deals. Therefore, 
we integrate the signalling theory with the institution-based view to unpack stock market reactions. 
The institutional perspective has emerged as an important paradigm, and posits that institutions in a 
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society influence firm strategy and performance (Buckley, et al., 2007; North, 1990; Peng, Wang, 
& Jiang, 2008). North (1990) defines institutions as the ‘rule of the game’ in a society. Similarly, 
Scott (1995) specified that institutions are ‘regulative, normative and cognitive structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’. Institutions have long been 
identified as a key factor affecting cross-border M&A performance (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; 
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003), given that cross-border M&A activities are subject to institutional 
constraints. Home and host-country institutions exert significant influence on the completion rates 
of cross-border M&A deals, and affect the integration and success of post cross-border M&As 
(Gubbi, et al., 2010; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011).  
The institution-based view as a widely adopted theoretical lens in IB research is also 
implicitly reflected in Dunning’s OLI paradigm. In more recent studies, Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) and Cantwell, Dunning and Lundan (2010) have explicitly proposed that institutional 
factors affecting both the determinants and the outcomes of MNE activity can be incorporated into 
the OLI paradigm. Building on the analysis of North (1990), Dunning and Lundan (2008) show the 
direct link between host-country institutional environments and the location-based (L) advantages 
in the OLI paradigm. The institutionally related location advantages differ between developed and 
developing countries. Specifically, well-established institutions help firms to reduce uncertainty 
and risk, and facilitate knowledge acquisition (Lu, et al., 2014; Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011; 
Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). The host country government can enhance its country’s location 
advantages by improving its institutions in order to attract foreign firms (Guler & Guillen, 2010; 
Witt & Lewin, 2007). Thus, the institutional environment in a host country has important 
implications for MNEs’ internationalization outcomes (Chung & Beamish, 2005; Cui & Jiang, 
2012; Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015; Holmes, et al., 2013; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Pangarkar & 
Lim, 2003; Wang, et al., 2012).  
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In the case of cross-border M&As, when assessing a firm’s value and evaluating its future 
performance to make investment decisions, investors perceive institutional information as an 
important signal, especially when they are unable to obtain adequate firm-specific information due 
to information asymmetries. The difference in regulations on financial markets may lead to 
different market reactions to the same M&A events. Thus, we expect that market reactions to 
cross-border M&A events in the Hong Kong stock market may differ from those in mainland 
Chinese stock markets. Moreover, when Chinese firms acquire firms from countries with different 
levels of political risk, which constitutes a major aspect of the institutional environment, stock 
market investors will interpret and respond to such cross-border M&As differently. Firms with 
different ownership status, such as SOEs or privately owned firms, may also generate different 
stock market reactions, resulting in different performance, given that SOEs can be perceived as a 
major element of Chinese economic institutions.  
 
2.1 Market reactions  
The announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms may release a strong signal to 
the market according to signalling theory. However, cross-border M&As are still a newly emerging 
activity for Chinese firms and Chinese investors. As a result, many Chinese firms involved in 
cross-border M&As are ‘first-time buyers’ who have not been involved in any cross-border M&As 
previously. Cross-border M&As by Chinese firms are typically interpreted as a very strong signal 
released by the top management of Chinese acquirers, indicating their ambitions and confidence in 
the global market (Gubbi, et al., 2010). Thus, the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms is likely to be perceived positively by stock market investors.  
In addition, the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms may indicate 
Chinese firms’ engagement in seeking strategic assets in order to enhance their performance and 
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catch up with global giants (Deng, 2007). M&As are used as an important approach through which 
Chinese firms obtain resources and capabilities that are not available in the domestic market (Deng, 
2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). These resources, including natural resources, patent-protected 
technologies, well-known brands, as well as superior managerial and marketing skills (Athreye & 
Kapur, 2009; Chen, 2008; Rui & Yip, 2008), can be converted into competitive advantages in the 
post-acquisition period. Thus, investors may perceive that cross-border M&As serve as a strategic 
means of addressing resource and capability deficits, and overcoming domestic market constraints. 
Moreover, firms can better exploit their existing resources and competitive advantages in new 
markets to realize economies of scale (Li, Li, & Wang, 2016). Therefore, cross-border M&As will 
be perceived to enhance the competitive advantages of Chinese firms by integrating the acquired 
resources and capabilities from overseas. Ultimately, investors will expect cross-border M&As to 
create shareholder value due to improved competitive advantage and firm performance.  
Finally, the Chinese government has promoted and encouraged Chinese firms to invest 
abroad with the ‘go abroad’ policy since 1999 (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). The support from the 
Chinese government in the form of tax deductions, low-interest loans and investment treaties with 
other governments has helped Chinese companies to deal with host-country governments and 
institutions (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). The Chinese government’s political and financial support is 
interpreted as a positive signal and thus leads to a positive market reaction.   
It should be noted that cross-border M&A announcements may negatively affect the market 
and hence lead to a decrease in stock prices (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). However, growing fast and 
being big has become a widely accepted strategy among Chinese firms and this strategy is 
supported by the Chinese government (Chen & Shih, 2008). In this regard, Chinese firms are likely 
to create positive market expectations due to the potential benefits associated with cross-border 
M&A deals. Hence, cross-border M&As are more likely to generate positive stock market 
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reactions in China (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007).  
In summary, for Chinese firms, cross-border M&As generally represent a unique and 
important strategic means of value creation, given that these activities enable Chinese firms to 
obtain critical resources and capabilities and help them overcome domestic institutional constraints 
in developing these critical resources, thus raising their profile in the eye of investors. These firms 
are likely to create positive market expectations due to various benefits associated with 
cross-border M&A deals. This can result in positive stock market reactions in general which in turn 
affect the market performance of those firms involved in cross-border M&A activities. Therefore, 
we propose:  
Hypothesis 1a: The announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms results in a 
positive stock market reaction.  
 
While we hypothesise that cross-border M&As by Chinese firms will generate positive 
market reactions, we also need to differentiate market reactions in mainland Chinese stock markets 
with the Hong Kong stock market, given the unique institutional settings of ‘one country, two 
systems’. There may be asymmetric market reactions to the same news in the two types of stock 
markets across China. The different market reactions in stock markets across China can be shown 
in the stock market prices and the magnitude of future volatility of return.   
Under the formula ‘one country, two systems’, the Hong Kong stock market is significantly 
different from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in mainland China. Good-news-chasing 
behaviour by investors has been observed in mainland China, but to a lesser degree in the Hong 
Kong stock market and stock markets in the developed world (Wang, Liu, & Wang, 2004). This 
good-news-chasing behaviour means that the impact of good news (positive unexpected shock) on 
future volatility is larger than that of bad news (negative unexpected shock) of the same magnitude 
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(Yeh & Lee, 2000) and could lead to different market reactions to cross-border M&A activities by 
Chinese firms. The good-news-chasing behaviour of investors in mainland China could be 
explained by the unique institutional features of stock markets in China. In mainland China, the 
liquidity of shares traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets is limited compared to those 
in the Hong Kong market, due to significant constraints on the tradability of state shares and 
legal-person shares (Yeung & Huang, 2014). Given the huge amount of ‘hot’ money flowing 
around the mainland China stock markets, limited liquidity of share trading will aggregate the 
market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&As. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of institutional investors, especially experienced international 
institutional investors in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets due to institutional restrictions. 
Most shares traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are domestic shares that are 
generally restricted to domestic investors (Wang & Jiang, 2004). Foreign investment is only 
allowed through a tightly-regulated structure known as the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(QFII) System. In mainland China, the turnover is overwhelmingly a result of actions by individual 
domestic retail investors. According to the Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistical Yearbook (2014), 
the retail investors in this market contributed 82.24% of total market turnover value which is 
considerably higher than the Hong Kong stock market (only 25%). A huge number of retail 
investors in the mainland Chinese stock markets, called ‘noise traders’, are relatively 
inexperienced in trading and they may respond more positively than others to the announcement of 
cross-border M&As because they have no access to inside information and so they can, at times, 
behave irrationally (Black, 1986). Driven by the lack of other investment options in 
less-established Chinese capital markets, and institutional restrictions, retail investors in mainland 
China are more proactive in the stock markets than those in any other main stock markets. Those 
irrationally optimistic retail investors in mainland China may react differently from experienced 
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overseas institutional investors in the Hong Kong stock market to the announcement of 
cross-border M&As. Accordingly, we proposed that:   
Hypothesis 1b: The positive stock market reaction is stronger in the mainland Chinese 
stock markets than in the Hong Kong stock market. 
 
In discussing the market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms, we further 
consider the extent to which the stock market performance of M&As is influenced by institutional 
characteristics associated with cross-border M&As. Specifically, we assess the extent of market 
reactions to political risks in target firms’ country of origin and the ownership status of acquiring 
firms. In doing so, we aim to capture the political dimension of the institutional environment of 
target firms’ country of origin, and different types of acquiring firms.  
 
2.2 Political Risk: stability and governance quality 
Political risk constitutes an important aspect of institutional environments and is closely 
connected to the way institutions function in a country (Bilson, Brailsford, & Hooper, 2002). It 
refers to the degree of political stability within a country, the quality of the laws, regulations, 
administrative procedures and policies formally sanctioned by the government (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2003). Host countries with different levels of political risk may have 
different performance implications with regard to cross-border M&As, which in turn can affect 
market reactions. In this study, we mainly consider two important dimensions of political risk, 
namely political stability and governance quality. 
Political Stability 
There are a number of reasons why the political stability of a target firm’s country of origin 
can affect market reactions to cross-border M&As. Firstly, the level of political stability may affect 
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investors’ risk perception, and thus lead to different market reactions (Bekaert, et al., 2014; Pástor 
& Veronesi, 2013; 2012). Since institutions are developed to create order and stable environments, 
and so promote economic exchange and cooperation (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985), host 
countries with high political stability imply low uncertainty and pose low risk to business activities. 
On the contrary, host countries with low political stability pose a serious challenge to the success of 
cross-border M&As (Cao & Liu, 2013). Foreign firms in particular can be more vulnerable targets 
during conflict due to their status of being outsiders (Hutchison & Gibler, 2007). For example, 
Chinese firms have heavily invested Africa, the Middle East and Latin America in recent years, but 
civil wars and regional conflicts due to political instability represent big threats to the safety of 
investment in these regions. In particular, the Libyan civil war in 2011 caused over $18 billion 
dollars of loss to 75 Chinese firms (New.cn, 2011). This implies that the stock market may react 
negatively to cross-border M&As if companies seek to acquire firms in countries with a high level 
of political instability since they may suffer heavy loss in the future.  
Secondly, uncertainty associated with sudden policy changes poses further challenges to 
firms (Bekaert, et al., 2014; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013; 2012). It is evident that Chinese firms have 
encountered U-turns in governmental policy towards foreign investments in some African 
countries when there has been a change of regime (Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015). Therefore, future 
M&As in similar countries may send out negative signals to investors due to the uncertainty. 
Thirdly, a low level of political stability is likely to have an impact on post-acquisition 
activities and hinder the acquirer’s efforts to establish and enforce cooperative agreements with 
local partners (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), thus leading to higher 
transaction costs when the company tries to acquire and integrate local resources. With uncertainty 
and high transaction costs, the acquired companies may find it hard to generate positive financial 
returns to pay dividends or create shareholder value, which will in turn be perceived as a negative 
 
17 
 
signal by the stock market. Therefore, we propose:   
Hypothesis 2a: The shareholders of Chinese firms that have acquired firms from countries 
with a high level of political stability gain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those that have 
acquired firms from countries with a low level of political stability. 
Governance quality 
The governance quality of the host country government and its agencies plays an essential 
role in the success of MNEs’ operations in such countries (Bekaert, et al., 2014; Berry, 2006; Pástor 
& Veronesi, 2013). Specifically, well-established rules and regulations help Chinese MNEs reduce 
the regulatory ambiguity associated with cross-border investments (Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015). 
Thus, acquiring firms are able to reduce information search costs and shorten the learning curve 
associated with foreign operations when investing in countries with clear rules and regulations 
(Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). Consequently, firms can devote their time and resources to 
post-acquisition integration and improved performance.  
In addition, the level of bribery and corruption in the host country government can also 
have an impact on firms investing in these countries. Corrupt practices in host countries where 
target companies originate not only represent legal and reputational risks, but also influence the 
financial viability of cross-border M&A deals (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). If a target company 
derives a proportion of its revenues through corrupt means, this can have a significant impact on 
the future cash flow of the firm when the acquiring company puts a stop to such corrupt practices 
(Clifford, 2012). Therefore, M&A deals in countries with a high level of corruption may send out 
negative signals to investors.  
Furthermore, advanced knowledge and resources are more likely to be learned and obtained 
from developed countries with a higher level of governance quality where more institutional 
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protection is provided for foreign direct investment (Berry, 2006). It is widely recognized that 
Chinese firms tend to seek high quality knowledge and resources through cross-border M&As, 
which has been identified as one of the two motivations of Chinese M&A deals alongside 
knowledge exploitation (Deng, 2007; Wang & Boateng, 2007; Zheng, et al., 2016). Chinese MNEs 
that lack modern managerial expertise, international market knowledge and advanced technology 
may be able to acquire valuable knowledge and resources when target firms are from institutionally 
developed countries because these countries are more likely to possess strategic resources needed 
by Chinese firms (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). Chinese firms can obtain advanced knowledge and 
resources by acquiring target companies from developed countries with high governance quality 
and low political risk (Cui, Meryer, & Hu, 2014; Liu, et al., 2016). Combining these acquired 
strategic resources, including technological knowledge, market knowledge and managerial 
knowledge, with low-cost advantage, Chinese firms are able to gain a unique, competitive 
advantage in both international markets and over their competitors in China who are unable to 
obtain the same knowledge and resources in the domestic market, thus boosting firm performance 
(Deng, 2010). Accordingly, we proposed that:   
Hypothesis 2b: The shareholders of Chinese firms that have acquired firms from countries 
with a high level of governance quality gain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those that 
have acquired firms from countries with a low level of governance quality. 
2.3 Ownership: SOE acquirer vs. private acquirers 
Firms with different ownership status are associated with different capabilities and behave 
differently, depending on different institutional constraints and competitive pressures (Zhou & 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). Research suggests that SOEs not only represent an ownership structure or a 
form of corporate governance, but are also products of the institutional environment (Bruton, et al., 
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2015; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Peng, 2000). This is particularly true in China where SOEs are an 
important instrument used by the government to control and coordinate economic activities (Bai, 
Lu, & Tao, 2006; Sun, Tong, & Tong, 2002; Tian & Estrin, 2008). This implies that SOEs can be 
perceived as a major element of economic institutions. Therefore, the ownership status of acquiring 
firms can affect the market performance of cross-border M&As by signalling different 
performance implications.  
First, Chinese SOEs obtain preferential treatment from the government and a favourable 
allocation of resources, which in turn improve the value of the companies (Blanchard & Shleifer, 
2001; Sun & Tong, 2003; Tian & Estrin, 2008). Therefore, the success of these companies often 
depends on their monopoly positions in the domestic market, rather than their management 
capability or advanced technology (Wu & Xie, 2010; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Their 
performance may be adversely affected when SOEs are moving from the Chinese domestic market 
to the international market (Lin, 2010). It is argued that cross-border M&As could lead to a lower 
performance of SOEs due to the weak corporate governance associated with state ownership, as 
well as possible political interference (Ning, et al., 2014). 
Unlike SOEs with a monopoly of government-controlled resources, private firms have to 
compete based on their technological and marketing capabilities in order to survive and prosper 
(Peng, 2001). Moreover, private firms tend to be more effective than SOEs in terms of market 
orientation and innovation (Peng, Wang, & Tong, 2004). In addition, many private firms have 
greater flexibility and autonomy in terms of management and decision making. This implies that 
private firms may be able to compete in foreign markets and integrate target firms more effectively 
than SOEs, thus leading to a higher level of performance (Liu, et al., 2016).    
Moreover, existing research indicates that most SOEs are more interested in utilities and 
infrastructure industries, such as energy, telecommunication and transport (OECD, 2008). 
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However, this may raise political and public concern in the host countries which they target, 
especially in developed countries (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015). The natural 
association between state ownership and the Chinese government may increase political 
sensitiveness and public concern (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011), 
which may lead to a negative impact on the market performance of SOE acquirers due to possible 
political interference. Therefore, the announcement of cross-border M&A deals by firms with 
different ownership statuses may send different signals to investors, which may result in different 
stock market reactions and post-acquisition performance. Hence, we propose 
Hypothesis 3: The shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers have lower cumulative 
abnormal returns from cross-border M&A deals than those of Chinese private acquirers.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The data on cross-border M&As by Chinese firms from January 2000 to December 2012 
was obtained from the Thomason One Banker database. Due to the implementation of the ‘Go 
Global’ policy initiated in 1999 by the Chinese government, and China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, large-scale cross-border M&As by Chinese firms started from 2000 
and this is why the year 2000 has been selected as a starting point of our investigation. For M&A 
deals, the Thomson One Banker provides a comprehensive database for global mergers and 
acquisitions which is widely used for academic research. In this study, all M&A deal-related data 
has been sourced from this database, including the announcement date, the name of both acquirers 
and target firms, as well as the home country of these firms. A Chinese acquiring firm should meet 
all the following criteria in order to be included in the sample: (i) the M&A deals are listed as 
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completed transitions; (ii) the firm has stock price data which is available on the Shanghai, 
Shenzhen or Hong Kong stock exchanges; (iii) the announcement date of M&A lies between 
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2012; and (iv) the target companies lie outside mainland China. 
The final usable sample consists of 165 cross-border M&As by Chinese acquiring firms.  
Table 2 provides an overview of the sample distribution in terms of the industry 
classification and ownership status of the acquiring firms, as well as the country of origin of foreign 
target firms. Most Chinese acquirers locate in the manufacturing industry (SIC 20-39) followed by 
the financial sector (SIC 60-67), which accounts for 58.79% and 12.12% of the total cross-border 
M&As respectively. For Chinese acquirers, Asia/Pacific firms were most frequently the target of 
cross-border acquisitions, and account for 49.09% of total cross-border M&As, followed by 
23.03% of acquisitions in North America and 20.61% in Europe. In addition, 58.18% of 
cross-border M&A deals were conducted by Chinese privately owned firms. 
Insert Table 2 near here 
3.2 Methodology 
Measurements 
We adopt the notion that stock market reactions to the announcement of cross-border 
M&As are reflected in the change of a listed firm’s share price around the occurrence of the event 
(Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013; Gubbi, et al., 2010) and thus the daily stock prices for acquiring 
firms around the announcement dates are used to measure the stock market performance of these 
firms. This measure has been widely used in international business and strategic management 
studies of M&As (Doukas & Travlos, 1998; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005). More specifically, we use cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to 
shareholders as a measure of short-term stock market performance. A company is classified as a 
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SOE if the government has a majority ownership share. 
Following previous studies (Gubbi, et al., 2010), we use the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) complied by Kaufman et al. (2010) to measure political risk. The WGI index constructs 
aggregate indicators of six dimensions of governance for 215 countries and territories from 1996 to 
2012. These six items include voice and accountability (VA), political stability and absence of 
violence (PS), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and 
control of corruption (CC). We use the first two items to measure political stability and the rest to 
measure governance quality. Each of these six items has values that range from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values reflecting lower political risk in the country of origin of respective target firms. 
Values ≥ 0 reflect lower levels of political risk, whereas those < 0 indicate higher levels of such 
risk.  
Event study 
In order to investigate the impact of Chinese cross-border M&As on the stock-market 
performance of acquiring firms, the event study method is employed to calculate and analyse 
cumulative abnormal returns (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2010). This method is 
based on the assumption of immediate information processing by stock market participants (Fama, 
1991) and can be used to determine whether there is an abnormal effect on stock prices associated 
with unanticipated events, such as M&As.  
Prior studies using the event study method indicate that investors use information about a 
firm’s cross-border M&As to adjust expectations about its performance potential, as evidenced by 
changes in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon the announcement of cross-border M&As. 
The event study method is widely used to capture market reactions to an announced event that was 
previously unexpected (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
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In order to assess the stock price reaction to announcements of cross-border of M&As, 
abnormal return (AR) is calculated based on a standard market model (Brown & Warner, 1985) 
which can be presented in the following equation.  
 
where  is the abnormal return,  is the actual daily stock return for firm  on day 
, and  is the daily return from the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange Composite Index and Hong Kong HangSheng Index on day . The coefficients 
 and  are OLS parameters estimated through the regression of  on .  
To measure the stock market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&As, the 
event window should be determined, which is the number of days over which there are possible 
abnormal returns caused by the event. A long window could dilute the possibility in finding any 
significant evidence. A short event window may not catch the effect of the event if the information 
comes out after the closing of the market and does not arrive in the public domain until the next 
day. Therefore, we use a 3-day, 5-day and 11-day event window to examine the stock market’s 
short-term response to the merger and acquisition announcement (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Bhabra & 
Huang, 2013). Furthermore, cumulative abnormal returns are calculated by summing the average 
AR for the days of the event window: 
 
where  is the cumulated abnormal return for the period of from t = day 1 until t = day 
n. 
To further assess whether the CAR is caused by the fluctuation of share prices, the 
statistical significance of the CARs is tested with t statistic  
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where  is the standard deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns. If the CAR 
observed during the announcement of Chinese cross-border M&As is significantly different from 
zero, it can be concluded that this event has a significant impact on the acquiring firms’ stock 
prices. 
4. Empirical results  
Table 3 presents the results of empirical analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) of 165 cross-border M&As by Chinese listed firms surrounding the cross-border merger 
and acquisition announcement dates. Around the announcement date, CARs are consistently 
positive with values of 0.84%, 0.89% and 1.22% for the (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-1, +1) windows, 
respectively. All of them are significant at the 1% and 5% level. The findings show that, on 
average, cross-border M&As by Chinese listed firms generated a positive market reaction by 
producing positive abnormal returns to the shareholdings of acquiring firms, thus supporting 
Hypothesis 1a. 
Insert Table 3 near here 
 
Table 4 reports the empirical results of the cumulative abnormal returns based on acquiring 
firms listed in different stock markets. For those listed in the mainland market, the mean CARs 
range from 0.79% to 1.53% and are statistically significant for the period of (-1, 0), (0, 1) and (-1, 
+1) during the announcement date. On the contrary, for those listed in the Hong Kong market, the 
mean CARs range from -0.10% to 1.16%. All of them are positive, but insignificant, except for the 
period of (-2, +2). This finding shows that the positive market reaction is more significant in the 
mainland stock markets than that in the Hong Kong market. Thus, these results support Hypothesis 
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1b.  
Insert Table 4 near here 
As shown in Table 5a-5f, we investigate hypotheses 2a and 2b by testing the six governance 
indicators one by one to compare the effect of different levels of each indicator on stock market 
performance. The findings show that for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms who have 
acquired the target firms from countries with a low level of political stability (e.g. VA and PS) and 
governance quality (e.g. GE, RQ, RL and CC), all of the CARs are insignificant. These indicate 
that the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms who purchase target firms from such a country 
have not generated substantial positive announcement gains. Conversely, for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms who purchase target firms from a country with a high level of political 
stability and governance quality, the CARs for (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-1, +1) are all positive and 
statistically significant. These indicate that the announcement of cross-border M&As for target 
firms from such a country have yielded highly significant wealth for the shareholders of acquiring 
firms surrounding the announcement date. The difference between the abnormal returns of 
acquiring firms that purchase target firms from countries with different levels of political stability 
and governance quality is illustrated in Tables 5a-5f. The results show that all the shareholders of 
acquiring firms that purchase target firms from a country with a high level of political stability and 
governance quality earn higher returns than those targeting firms from a country with a low level of 
political stability and governance quality. These further demonstrate that a high level of political 
stability and governance quality is perceived positively and this results in a high level of stock 
market performance. Taken together, the empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 2a and 
Hypothesis 2b.  
 
Insert Table 5a-5f near here 
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The results of testing the impact of the ownership status of Chinese acquiring firms are 
illustrated in Table 6. The results in the first two columns in Table 6 indicate that for SOE acquirers, 
the CARs for (-1, 0), (0, +1), (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) are positive, but statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that the shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers did not experience substantial positive 
wealth gains. Conversely, for privately owned firms (acquirers), the CARs show positive returns 
during all announcement dates. For the event window (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-1, +1), the shareholders 
of Chinese private firms experienced statistically significant positive CARs of 1.31%, 1.28% and 
1.88%, respectively. These results indicate that the announcement of the cross-border M&As for 
private acquiring firms yielded highly significant wealth gain for their shareholders. The difference 
between the abnormal returns of the private acquirers and SOE acquirers is illustrated in Table 6. 
The results indicate that cross-border M&As created higher returns for the shareholders of Chinese 
private acquirers than those of Chinese SOE acquirers surrounding the announcement date, except 
for the period of (-5, +5). Taken together, these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3.   
Insert Table 6 near here 
5. Discussion  
5.1. The main findings 
 
Accompanying the rapid development of the Chinese economy since the open door policy 
and economic reforms over past decades, Chinese firms are playing an increasingly important role 
in cross-border M&A activities (Li, Li, & Wang, 2016; Zheng, et al., 2016). However, we have 
limited understanding of the performance implications of such activities. This study examines the 
stock market reaction to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms based on signalling theory and the 
institution-based view. The results indicate that cross-border M&As by Chinese firms are 
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interpreted by the stock market as strong signals released by Chinese acquirers which result in a 
significant, positive stock market reaction. This implies that M&A activities by Chinese firms 
symbolize these firms’ global ambitions and financial status, and are perceived as a spring board to 
acquiring strategic resources and capabilities abroad in order to seize opportunities and enhance 
competitive advantage in the global market. Thus, the announcement of cross-border M&As is 
perceived positively and has resulted in an increase in stock prices through a positive stock market 
reaction.  
Our findings are consistent with the majority of previous studies (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 
2011; Boateng, Wang, & Yang, 2008; Wang & Boateng, 2007; Zhou, et al., 2015) on cross-border 
M&As by EE firms, but are contrary to Aybar and Ficici’s study (2009) and Chen and Young’s 
study (2010). Aybar and Ficici (2009) used a sample from 13 key emerging economies between 
1991 and 2004, without including China. However, unlike other emerging economies (e.g. India, 
Russia, and Malaysia), Chinese firms’ cross-border M&As have unique characteristics due to the 
unique institutional environment and may trigger different market reactions. This may be the main 
reason why our findings differ from those of Aybar and Ficici (2009). Chen and Young (2010) 
studied 39 deals by 32 Chinese firms from 2000 to 2008 and showed that the announcement of 
cross-border M&As resulted in negative average CARs for Chinese acquirers. Their results are 
based on a relatively small sample which also includes foreign-invested companies within 
mainland China as acquired/target firms. Their sample period from 2000 to 2008 represented an 
early stage of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. These factors together may largely influence 
the empirical results and yield a different conclusion. Our findings drawn from a sample period up 
to 2012 may reflect the increasing importance of cross-border M&As in the short-term market 
performance of Chinese listed firms due to the strong market reactions.  
The findings show that there are asymmetric market reactions to cross-border M&As by 
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Chinese firms in mainland Chinese stock markets and the Hong Kong stock market. Different 
market reactions in these stock markets reflect the institutional arrangements of ‘one country, two 
systems’ cross China. The mainland Chinese stock markets behave differently from that in Hong 
Kong. The former exhibit good-news-chasing behaviour which generates more significant 
reactions to the same M&A events than those in the Hong Kong stock market. This suggests that 
the ‘one country, two markets’ scenario results in different magnitudes of market perceptions. 
Investors in mainland China suffer from significant information asymmetries and limited 
investment options due to the underdeveloped capital market and thus they are more likely to 
overestimate the positive impact of cross-border M&A deals compared with those in the Hong 
Kong stock market. This finding demonstrates that the impact of cross-border M&As is affected by 
financial institutional arrangements. 
Furthermore, we have evaluated the market performance implications of M&As in terms of 
the target firms’ countries of origin, with different levels of political risk, and the ownership status 
of the acquiring firms (SOEs vs private firms) from the institutional perspective. Chinese 
cross-border M&As benefit from well-established institutions and a stable investment environment 
in target countries with a low level of political risk. These target countries may enable Chinese 
acquirers to access a high quality of strategic resources, technological knowledge and market 
knowledge which are not available in the domestic market or in other emerging economies. Thus, 
the shareholders of acquiring firms that purchase a target firm from an institutionally developed 
country with a low level of political risk can gain higher returns than those shareholders of 
acquiring firms who invest in countries with a high level of political risk. Chinese firms use 
cross-border M&As to signal their quality, especially when targeting firms are from institutionally 
well-developed countries with a low level of political risk. This shows that cross-border M&As 
enable Chinese firms to span national boundaries to gain strategic assets and credibly enhance their 
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global reputation (Siegel, 2009), thus generating positive market reactions. Our findings are 
consistent with real-life events. For example, the announcement of ICBC’s acquisition of Halim 
Bank Indonesia only resulted in a 0.54% increase in its share price in 2006. However, the 
announcement of ICBC’s acquisition of BEA Canada resulted in a 4.15% increase in share price in 
2011.  
The results suggest that cross-border M&As have different performance implications for 
acquiring firms with different ownership status. More specifically, the shareholders of Chinese 
SOE acquirers experience lower CARs than those of Chinese private acquirers. The possible 
reason is that SOE acquirers face stronger institutional restrictions than private acquirers which 
may give a negative signal to investors, and this in turn is reflected in stock prices. The empirical 
results also reveal the hidden relationship between ownership status and the market performance of 
cross-border M&As. The shareholders of Chinese SOE acquirers earn a lower level of abnormal 
returns than those of private acquirers. This finding implies that SOEs, as both economic and 
political actors, may carry the baggage embedded in the institutional environment of their home 
country, and investors may be sceptical about the political motivations of cross-border M&As by 
SOE acquirers, thus resulting in lower shareholder value.  
5.2. Contributions 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three main ways. First, unlike previous 
studies, we integrate signal theory and the institution-based view to examine the short-term 
performance implications of Chinese cross-border M&As, and unpack what is behind such 
activities. The findings from our study provide new insights into cross-border M&A value 
generation through market reactions and the extent to which short-term market performance 
reflects investors’ perception on the institutional characteristics of M&A events. Although it is well 
documented that Chinese firms use cross-border M&As as a strategic means of acquiring valuable 
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technology, brands and managerial capability, there is a lack of evidence on the market reactions to 
this important strategic approach. Our study thus adds much needed evidence on the link between 
market reactions and the unique institutional characteristics embedded in cross-border M&As by 
Chinese firms.   
Second, this study takes a first step towards investigating the impact of the institutional 
setting of the financial markets on market reactions to cross-border M&As by revealing the 
different magnitudes of such reactions under ‘one country, two systems’. The findings imply that 
the short-term market performance of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms is contingent on the 
development of the capital market. Investors in less developed capital markets may overestimate 
the positive impact of cross-border M&As.  
Third, this study explicitly evaluates the impact of various types of political risks on market 
reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. Political stability and governance quality are 
two important components of political risks. By delineating political risk into different 
components, our research provides new insights into the link between different dimensions of 
political risks, and stock market reactions to M&A announcements, and fills a research gap, given 
that there is a lack of research in this area. Additionally, we capture the impact of the ownership of 
the acquiring firms and contribute to a better understanding of the impact of ownership status on 
the short-term performance of cross-border M&As from the institutional perspective. SOEs 
represent a product of the Chinese institutional environment, and their M&A activities are 
perceived differently compared with privately owned firms, thus resulting in different short-term 
market performance. Therefore, our study further reveals the impact of the institutional dimension 
embedded in the ownership status of Chinese acquiring firms. 
5.3 Implications for management practice 
This study has a number of implications for practitioners and policy makers. First, our 
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research shows that the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese firms results in a positive 
stock market reaction which is more significant in the mainland China markets than in the Hong 
Kong market. This suggests that policy makers need to design appropriate regulations and further 
develop the capital market to avoid good-news-chasing behaviour by removing ownership 
restrictions, currency control and liquidity restrictions. Establishing a well-functional capital 
market can reduce the dramatic volatility of market reactions to cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms.  
Second, our research draws attention to an important factor - political risk within target 
countries - which affects the market reaction to cross-border M&As. China’s increased presence in 
Africa and other developing countries has raised concerns due to the high levels of political risk. 
The findings confirm the negative impact of political risk on market reactions to cross-border 
M&As, and thus suggest that Chinese investors should be aware of the detrimental impact of 
political risk when acquiring target firms from those host countries. Therefore, Chinese managers 
who deal with cross-border M&As should take political risk seriously to reduce their vulnerability 
and minimize loss when things go wrong. For policy makers of target countries, an improvement of 
the overall political environment is required when attracting future Chinese investment as firms 
may become cautious when making M&A decisions in order to avoid a negative market reaction. 
Third, the findings from our research provide useful guidance not only for Chinese 
acquiring firms that are expanding globally, but also for overseas target firms who are looking for 
buyers or investors in a bi-directional selection process. Our findings show that the shareholders of 
Chinese SOE acquirers experience lower cumulative abnormal returns than those of Chinese 
private acquirers when engaging in cross-border M&As. Therefore, overseas target firms who are 
seeking buyers from emerging markets should keep in mind that state ownership may influence the 
financial market investors’ reactions.  
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5.4 Limitations and directions for future research  
There are some limitations in this research which point to avenues for future research. First, 
this study only focuses on cross-border M&As undertaken by Chinese firms. Therefore, the 
findings may be specific to the research setting. Future research should extend the sample to other 
emerging economies, such as India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Second, due to data 
availability, only publicly listed firms have been investigated. Future research should consider 
non-listed Chinese firms in order to generate a more complete picture of the impact of cross-border 
M&As by Chinese firms. Third, this study has mainly evaluated the impact of differences in 
China’s stock markets, political risk and ownership structure on the short-term performance of 
cross-border M&As by Chinese firms. In particular, we have used fine-grained measures to capture 
different dimensions of political risk. However, other factors, including the characteristics of 
shareholders, a firm's industry, the state of management, unfavourable exchange rates, and the 
broad economic conditions of a host country and the home country can also affect market reactions. 
This represents a promising avenue for future studies. Fourth, we have only examined the 
short-term impact of cross-border M&As on stock market performance. Future research should 
investigate the long-term performance implications of cross-border M&As and reveal whether the 
same institutional factors and internal conditions have differing impacts on the short-term and 
long-term performance of cross-border M&As by emerging market firms.  
6. Conclusion 
Adopting signalling theory and the institution-based view, this study examines how stock markets 
react to the announcement of cross-border M&As by Chinese listed firms and whether institutional 
characteristics associated with cross-border M&As generate different market reactions and result 
in different short-term market performance. An event study analysis based on a sample of Chinese 
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listed firms from 2000 to 2012 finds that the stock market, on average, responded positively and 
significantly to cross-border M&A announcements. The magnitude of such a market reaction to 
cross-border M&A events is greater in the mainland Chinese stock markets than that of the Hong 
Kong stock market. This may indicate that the mainland China stock markets are underdeveloped 
and tend to overreact to cross-border M&A announcements due to ‘good-news-chasing’ behaviour 
and irrational trading. We have further investigated the extent to which the political risk inherent in 
the target firms’ country of origin and the ownership status of acquiring firms affect stock market 
reactions. The findings show that the level of political risk and SOE ownership are negatively 
associated with the short-term market performance of Chinese acquiring firms. Taken together, our 
study helps to provide new insights into the relationship between the short-term market 
performance and the institutional characteristics associated with cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms.  
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Table 1: A summary of existing studies on the link between cross-border M&As 
and stock market performance  
Market Author(s), (year) Sample period  Details of Sample Findings 
Panel A: Developed markets  
US Dodd (1980) 1970-1977 151 takeovers -0.23% cumulative abnormal return on the 
announcement date from completed bids 
US Bradley et al. 
(1983) 
1962-1980 241 successful deals, 
94 unsuccessful  deals 
-0.64% insignificant returns for the 
unsuccessful bidders over -20 and +20 days 
period 
US Lang et al. 
(1989) 
1968-1986 87 targets and bidders 
from successful 
tender offers 
Negative impact on bidder returns when the 
bid is made by a firm with a low Tobin's q  
US Smith and Kim 
(1994) 
1980-1986 177 bidders and 
targets 
0.23% significant abnormal returns over -1 
and 0 days 
US Floreani and 
Rigamonti 
(2001) 
1996-2000 56 listed acquirers 3.65%.abnormal returns obtained by 
insurance companies 
US Song and 
Walking (2004) 
1985-2001 5726 mergers and 
acquisitions 
Acquiring firms with a period of more than 
one year of 'dormant' bid activity receive a 
positive abnormal return of 0.8%. Acquirers 
with a 'dormant' period of less than one year 
earn insignificant returns  
US Faccio et al. 
(2006) 
1996-2001 4429 acquirers of 
listed and unlisted 
targets 
-0.38% significant abnormal returns for 
acquirers of unlisted targets, while 1.48% 
significant abnormal returns for acquirers  
US Masulis et al. 
(2007) 
1990-2003 3333 completed 
acquisitions 
Acquires operating in more competitive 
industries or separating the positions of CEO 
and chairman of the board experience higher 
abnormal announcement returns 
UK Holl and 
Kyriazis (1997) 
1979-1989 178 successful bids -1.25% significantly negative abnormal 
returns for bidders over the two months after 
the bid announcement 
UK Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) 
1983-1995 519 listed acquirers between -1.39% and -1.47% significantly 
negative abnormal returns for UK acquirers 
UK Conn et al., 
(2005) 
1984-1998 4344 acquisitions Significantly positive announcement returns 
for bidders when the culture difference is 
great between U.K. bidders firms and foreign 
target firms 
UK Gregory and 
McCorriston 
(2005) 
1985-1994 343 acquisitions Short-run returns are insignificantly different 
from zero irrespective of the location of the 
acquisition 
EU Campa and 
Hernando (2004) 
1998-2000 262 mergers and 
acquisitions 
-1.96% negative abnormal returns for 
regulated EU acquirers over 60 days around 
the bid announcement. No significant returns 
for bidders from unregulated industries for 
the same period 
EU Goergen and 
Renneboog 
(2004) 
1993-2000 187 bidders 1.2% significantly cumulative abnormal 
returns for bidders over 5 days around the 
announcement date 
EU Chari et al. 
(2010) 
1986-2006 594 acquisitions in 
emerging markets and 
1624 acquisitions in 
developed markets 
1.16% significantly positive abnormal 
returns for developed-marker acquirers over 
a three-day event window 
Canada Ben-Amar and 
Andre (2006) 
1998-2000 238 mergers and 
acquisitions by 138 
Canadian firms 
1.6% abnormal returns for acquiring firms 
over 3 days 
Canada Dutta et al. 
(2013) 
1993-2002 1300 completed 
acquisitions 
Significantly positive abnormal returns for 
Canadian acquiring firms' shares around the 
announcement date 
Panel B: Emerging market 
India Gubbi et al. 
(2010) 
2000-2007 425 cross-border 
acquisitions by Indian 
firms 
International acquisitions by Indian firms 
earn significantly positive value for their 
shareholders 
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India and 
China 
Nicholson and 
Salaber (2013) 
2000-2010 203 Indian and 63 
Chinese cross-border 
deals 
Cross-border acquisitions made by Indian 
and Chinese firms lead to significant 
shareholder wealth creation. Indian 
shareholders are more likely to benefit from 
deals in small culture distance countries, 
While Chinese investors gain from 
cross-border expansion of manufacturing 
companies 
China Chen and Young 
(2010) 
 
2000-2008 39 deals by 32 
Chinese MNEs  
Negative average cumulated abnormal 
returns for Chinese acquiring MNEs 
China Ning et al. 
(2014) 
1991-2010 335 acquisitions Significant positive shareholder value for 
Chinese acquiring MNEs 
Emerging 
market 
Aybar and Ficici 
(2009) 
1991-2004 433 acquisitions by 58 
emerging-market 
multinationals 
The equity markets react negatively to the 
emerging market cross-border acquisition 
announcement 
Emerging 
market 
Bhagat et al. 
(2011) 
1991-2008 698 acquisitions by 
publicly listed firms 
from eight emerging 
countries 
Emerging country acquirers experience a 
positive and significant market response of 
1.09% on the announcement day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Information on the sample firms  
 N 
% of 
sample   N 
% of 
sample 
Acquirers’ industry    Target Country   
  SIC 10-14 Mining 19 12.00%    Europe 34 20.61% 
  SIC 20-39 Manufacturing 97 58.79%    Asia/Pacific 81 49.09% 
  SIC 40-49 Transportation and    
communications 7 4.24%    North America 38 23.03% 
  SCI 50-59 Wholesale and Retail 8 4.85%    Others 12 7.27% 
  SIC 60-67 Finance 20 12.12%    Total  165  
  SIC 70-89 Services 14 8.48%     
  Total 165      
       
Ownership status of acquirers       
  State-owned  69 41.82%     
  Private 96 58.18%     
  Total  165      
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Table 3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Chinese acquiring firms 
 N Mean s.d. t-Stat Positive: negative % positive  
CAR (-1, 0) 165 0.0084 0.0402 2.682*** 92:73 55.76% 
CAR (0, +1) 165 0.0089 0.0503 2.275** 86:79 52.12% 
CAR (-1, +1) 165 0.0122 0.0539 2.902*** 93:72 56.36% 
CAR (-2, +2) 165 0.0050 0.0718 0.890 89:76 53.94% 
CAR (-5, +5) 165 0.0093 0.0936 1.278 80:85 51.52% 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 4: Market reactions: Mainland China vs. Hong Kong 
Event window 
Mainland  Hong Kong  Market effect 
N Mean CARM  t-Stat  N Mean CARH  t-Stat  CARM-CARH t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 103 0.0133 2.997***  62 0.0003 0.079  0.0130 1.037 
CAR (0, +1) 103 0.0104 2.372**  62 0.0064 0.851  0.0040 0.537 
CAR (-1, +1) 103 0.0153 2.992***  62 0.0070 0.964  0.0083 0.934 
CAR (-2, +2) 103 0.0086 1.334  62 -0.0010 -0.098  0.0096 0.787 
CAR (-5, +5) 103 0.0079 0.970  62 0.0116 0.834  -0.0037 -0.265 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5a: VA: High VA vs. Low VA 
Event window 
Low VA   High VA   VA effect 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat   CARH-CARL t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 22 -0.0034 -0.381  143 0.0093 2.833***  0.0127 1.320 
CAR (0, +1) 22 0.0008 0.077  143 0.0095 2.304**  0.0087 0.754 
CAR (-1, +1) 22 0.0005 0.052  143 0.0131 2.934***  0.0126 1.210 
CAR (-2, +2) 22 -0.0025 -0.172  143 0.0056 0.939  0.0081 0.511 
CAR (-5, +5) 22 -0.0099 -0.435   143 0.0108 1.414   0.0207 0.860 
Note: VA=Voice and Accountability 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 5b: PS: High PS vs. Low PS 
Event window 
Low PS   High PS   PS effect 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat   CARH-CARL t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 16 0.0056 0.888  149 0.0087 2.559**  0.0031 0.433 
CAR (0, +1) 16 0.0124 1.806*  149 0.0085 1.995**  -0.0039 -0.483 
CAR (-1, +1) 16 0.0080 1.048  149 0.0126 2.758***  0.0046 0.518 
CAR (-2, +2) 16 0.0076 0.817  149 0.0047 0.768  -0.0029 -0.260 
CAR (-5, +5) 16 0.0237 1.300   149 0.0078 0.993   -0.0159 -0.984 
Note: PS=Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 5c: GE: High GE vs. Low GE 
Event window 
Low GE   High GE   GE effect 
N Mean CARL  
t-Stat   N Mean CARH  
t-Stat   CARH-CARL t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 25 -0.0038 -0.511  140 0.0096 2.870***  0.0134 1.647 
CAR (0, +1) 25 0.0141 1.691  140 0.0084 1.983**  -0.0057 -0.610 
CAR (-1, +1) 25 0.0062 0.655  140 0.0128 2.824***  0.0066 0.063 
CAR (-2, +2) 25 -0.0018 -0.121  140 0.0056 0.944  0.0074 0.470 
CAR (-5, +5) 25 0.0263 1.372   140 0.0076 0.979   -0.0187 -0.904 
Note: GE=Government Effectiveness 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5d: RQ: High RQ vs. Low RQ 
Event window 
Low RQ   High RQ   RQ effect 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat   CARH-CARL t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 13 0.0016 0.158  152 0.0090 2.728***  0.0074 0.716 
CAR (0, +1) 13 0.0124 1.293  152 0.0086 2.062**  -0.0038 -0.364 
CAR (-1, +1) 13 0.0093 0.913  152 0.0124 2.774***  0.0031 0.278 
CAR (-2, +2) 13 -0.0018 -0.116  152 0.0056 0.939  0.0074 0.436 
CAR (-5, +5) 13 0.0362 1.807*   152 0.0070 0.910   -0.0292 -1.359 
Note: RQ=Regulator Quality 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 5e: RL: High RL vs. Low RL 
Event window 
Low RL   High RL   RL effect 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH t-Stat   CARH-CARL t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 19 0.0004 0.066  146 0.0094 2.757***  0.0090 1.196 
CAR (0, +1) 19 0.0108 1.591  146 0.0087 1.996**  -0.0021 -0.261 
CAR (-1, +1) 19 0.0057 0.756  146 0.0130 2.804***  0.0073 0.822 
CAR (-2, +2) 19 -0.0005 -0.047  146 0.0057 0.926  0.0062 0.477 
CAR (-5, +5) 19 0.0170 1.087   146 0.0083 1.040   -0.0087 -0.495 
Note: RL=Rule of Law 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 5f: CC: High CC vs. Low CC 
Event window 
Low CC   High CC   CC effect 
N Mean CARL  t-Stat   N Mean CARH  t-Stat   
CARH-CAR
L 
t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 21 0.0019 0.309  144 0.0093 2.698***  0.0074 1.020 
CAR (0, +1) 21 0.0097 1.544  144 0.0088 1.999**  -0.0009 -0.117 
CAR (-1, +1) 21 0.0083 1.101  144 0.0128 2.719***  0.0045 0.508 
CAR (-2, +2) 21 0.0017 0.163  144 0.0054 0.876  0.0037 0.300 
CAR (-5, +5) 21 0.0197 1.323   144 0.0078 0.966   -0.0119 -0.702 
Note: CC=Control of Corruption 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Ownership: SOE acquirer vs. private acquirers 
Event 
window 
SOE  Private  
Ownership status 
effect 
N 
Mean 
CARS  t-Stat  N 
Mean 
CARP  t-Stat  
CARP-C
ARS t-Value 
CAR (-1, 0) 69 0.0019 0.582  96 0.0131 2.722*** 0.0112 1.934* 
CAR (0, +1) 69 0.0035 1.079  96 0.0128 2.03**  0.0093 1.311 
CAR (-1, +1) 69 0.0030 0.766  96 0.0188 2.852*** 0.0158 2.066** 
CAR (-2, +2) 69 -0.0037 -0.628  96 0.0112 1.298  0.0149 1.433 
CAR (-5, +5) 69 0.0146 1.572  96 0.0055 0.518  -0.0091 -0.644 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
